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Paper 
Abstract 
This article explains how infrastructures with a sustainability record may evolve over 
time into a lock-in that slows the emergence of more sustainable urban infrastructures. A 
study of waste incineration in the Göteborg Metropolitan Area, Sweden, serves as an 
illustrative case. Taking leads from Unruh (2000; 2002), four rationales of lock-in are 
identified in the case: institutional, technical, cultural, and material. The article describes 
how these rationales, one by one and in collaboration, lock-in waste handling in the Göte-
borg Metropolitan Area to incineration. The article also suggests that these four rationales 
could serve as a program to unlock urban infrastructures. Asking the question “Are we in 
a lock-in?” is featured as a practical starting point for planning changes in urban infra-
structure governance that contribute to sustainability. 
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1. Introduction 
Urban infrastructures are socio-technological systems that enable and regulate 
the efficient production, distribution, and consumption of environmentally rele-
vant flows such as energy, water, materials, and services such as transportation 
(van Vliet, 2011). Therefore, such infrastructures are legitimately expected to 
play a key role in the urgently needed evolution of cities toward more sustaina-
bility (Peer Review Panel, 2010).  
Concerned with how infrastructures actually contribute to urban sustainabil-
ity, this paper examines the case of waste incineration in the Göteborg Metropol-
itan Area, Sweden (hereafter Göteborg): an infrastructure that has long been 
considered as serving a sustainable urban development but that, due to changes 
in conditions and demands, has started to be considered as delivering less than 
optimal solutions. Our contention is that, already in place and well maintained, 
incineration in Göteborg stands for a techno-institutional order that tends to get 
in the way of innovation and prevents alternative infrastructural solutions from 
emerging. In Unruh’s (2000, 2002; Unruh & Carrillo-Hermosilla, 2006) terms, 
incineration is a lock-in that wedges the waste management in Göteborg to the 
next lowest step of the European Waste Hierarchy and slows the evolution of 
Göteborg and its region toward increased urban sustainability. 
This paper builds on earlier research on lock-in and shows the theoretical 
and practical relevance of understanding urban infrastructure lock-in (or locking-
in if one refers to the process that leads to a lock-in) for the planning and gov-
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2 
ernance of cities towards sustainability. The lock-in of waste incineration in 
Göteborg is found to follow four rationales: institutional, technical, cultural, and 
material. We analyze each of these rationales, and show how they interact to 
effectively lock-in waste management in Göteborg to incineration. We show also 
how these four rationales can serve as a general heuristic to see if an infrastruc-
ture lock-in is involved, and, correspondingly, to look for ways to unlock infra-
structures. 
 
2. Understanding lock-in 
Unruh (2000, 2002) has brought to the fore the notion of lock-in within the con-
text of energy policy. He coined the notion of carbon lock-in to describe how 
technological, political, and social forces co-build a techno-institutional complex 
that prevents the diffusion of carbon-saving technologies.  
Unruh’s analysis is a reminder that technological systems do not exist in a 
social vacuum. They are embedded in coalitions of industry networks, together 
with private and public institutions such as trade-unions, trade-associations, or 
governmental agencies. These coalitions effectively lock-in producers, users, and 
regulators in dynamic webs of technologies, legislation, standards, physical 
infrastructures, politics, and cultural norms, inclusive of institutionalized rules-
of-thumb.  
The notion of lock-in originates from historical studies of science and tech-
nology. Hughes’s (1983) study of the electrification of Berlin, Chicago, London, 
and California is a landmark illustration of the embeddedness (Granovetter, 
1985) of the development of technological systems in local history, geography, 
and political culture. Hughes shows that technological systems follow different 
development styles that fit the idiosyncrasies of the time and place of their de-
velopment rather than any technology-specific determinism. Likewise, Cowan 
(1990) explains how national security considerations gave a first mover’s ad-
vantage to the potentially inferior light water nuclear power technology so that it 
could entrench itself in the market for power reactors and dominate the potential-
ly superior heavy water technology. Both these studies illustrate how history 
keeps re-surfacing in present technology. On this account, lock-in draws even on 
the insight gained in science and technology studies that technological systems 
are neither purely social nor purely technical, but semiotico-material arrange-
ments (Callon, 1986). These arrangements are more or less stabilized and there-
fore more or less stable, depending on the relationships that exist between the 
human and non-human actors that compose the system (e.g., Latour, 1996).  
The notion of lock-in also originates from economic studies of the diffusion 
of technological innovation. For Arthur (1989), technological lock-ins are the 
logical consequence of technologies that, if adopted, generate increasing returns. 
The more these technologies are adopted, the more people gain experience with 
them, and the more these technologies are improved. Increasing returns to adop-
tion generate positive network externalities that have the capacity to transform 
small initial advantages into positions of dominance from which competing 
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technologies can be locked-out. The notion of path-dependence (e.g., Liebowitz 
& Margolis, 1995; Schreyögg & Sydow, 2010) is close to the notion of lock-in. 
Both notions underscore that today’s solutions are constrained by yesterday’s 
choices, even if these choices have lost their relevance and even if new alterna-
tives have emerged that are more efficient and effective than the solutions that 
currently dominate. However, whereas path-dependence focuses on the con-
straints that the past puts on present decisions, lock-in describes a current state of 
things. And Grabher (1993) identifies three types of lock-in: functional (e.g., 
through joint-investments or personal ties), cognitive (e.g., because of common 
ways of interpreting or envisioning things), and political (e.g., through profes-
sional associations or coalitions of industrialists and politicians). 
It is not easy to break a lock-in. The coalitions that benefit from it are likely 
to resist any change; it is difficult to challenge established standards, and few 
wish to abandon the comfort of increasing returns. Yet, escaping lock-ins is 
possible. Cowan and Hultén (1996) suggest that just like the process of locking-
in can start with a small historical event or a sequence of events, possibilities for 
unlocking technologies can emerge from any combination of the following: a 
crisis in the existing technology; regulation; technological breakthrough produc-
ing a (real or imagined) cost breakthrough; changes in tastes; niche markets; or 
scientific results. Taking as an example the defeat of electrical vehicles to gaso-
line cars in the early years of the 20th century, they note that a defeated technolo-
gy can reappear more than a century later when conditions have changed. And 
D'Costa (2002) shows that market diversification, in particular, efforts to devel-
op the domestic market, are ways to break the lock-in of the Indian software 
industry in low, value-added activities. More generally, Unruh and Carrillo-
Hermosilla explain (2006), un-locking technology systems requires a combina-
tion of systematic efforts to promote alternatives, a critical mass or social and 
political recognition of a need for social action, and a focusing event that acts as 
a catalyst for concerns and initiatives. However, the more globalized a lock-in, 
the more difficult it is to dismantle it. 
These difficulties to escape from a lock-in present challenges for city gov-
ernance authorities. Responsible for providing day-to-day urban services and 
often the owners of the infrastructures that provide these services, city govern-
ance authorities are also facing increasing demands to develop the city toward 
more sustainability. And such demands often require confronting existing sus-
tainability lock-ins. 
Breaking the lock-in of technology systems and infrastructures is indeed fea-
tured as central for achieving more sustainable urban transformations (Coutard, 
1999). Some researchers have put forward strong demands for public policies of 
research and development and publicly-funded projects that counteract lock-ins 
(e.g., Hekkert, van Giessel, Ros, Wietschel, & Meeus, 2005). Others show that 
public authorities with foresight can engage in coordinating, rather than correc-
tive, activities and set up voluntary environmental agreements that have the 
potential to introduce discontinuity into a techno-institutional lock-in (Könnölä, 
Unruh, & Carrillo-Hermosilla, 2006). Yet others observe that public sector ini-
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tiatives can invent new coordinating linkages between users (Yarime, 2009). 
This proves that it is possible to escape a lock-in and voice innovative infrastruc-
tural solutions, even if they are within clear limits when it comes to outcomes. 
The case of waste management in Göteborg shows how narrow these limits can 
be and how they can be challenged. 
 
3. Method  
This article is based on an explanatory case study (Yin, 1994) of the waste incin-
eration in Göteborg. In designing the study, we first took leads from Unruh’s 
Unruh’s (2000, 2002) thesis that technological, political, and social forces create 
a carbon lock-in of energy systems and prevent the diffusion of carbon-saving 
technologies as preliminary categories for data collection and data analysis. 
When coding and categorizing the data (Strauss & Corbin, 1990), we have sys-
tematically probed whether Göteborg’s waste management system could be 
considered as a lock-in according to Unruh’s definition, and if this is the case, 
what could have created and could maintain this lock-in. 
During the coding work, the three forces identified by Unruh (2000) (tech-
nological, institutional, and social) that we used to organize our analysis evolved 
into four lock-in rationales: institutional, technical, cultural, and material – the 
term rationale being intended to render the fact that we are speaking of logics or 
rationalities rather than mechanical forces. And we found that these four ration-
ales are not only showing that incineration in Göteborg is a case of lock-in. They 
also explain why this is the case. 
Our research strategy has been pragmatic in the sense that we have com-
bined methods (Silverman, 1993) with the aim of being able to understand and 
render the techno-institutional richness of waste incineration in Göteborg. It is 
also pragmatic in the sense that it is neither purely inductive nor deductive, but 
follows patterns of creative abduction (Schurz, 2008). Inspired by Strauss and 
Corbin (1990), our collection, coding, and categorizing of data has involved 
back-and-forth moves between sorting, coding, probing the data, and collecting 
new data until we could reconstruct the multi-layered historical developments 
with the present state of waste governance in Göteborg. 
Data was generated from 20 face-to-face open interviews (Kvale, 1996; Sil-
verman, 1993). We met with officials in the Swedish Environmental Protection 
Agency (Naturvårdsverket), politicians and officials of the City of Göteborg 
(Göteborg Stad), officials of the Göteborg Region Association of Local Authori-
ties (Göteborgsregionens kommunalförbund), and managers and waste manage-
ment workers at Renova AB, the waste management company that the munici-
pality of Göteborg and ten other municipalities in the metropolitan area co-own 
to handle waste within their jurisdiction. The interviews lasted from 45 to 90 
minutes; they were recorded and transcribed verbatim for analysis.  
Data was also generated from A2020, which is the waste plan for the Göte-
borg Region Association of Local Authorities (Göteborgsregionens kommu-
nalförbund, 2010), and diverse informational materials from brochures, reports, 
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and Websites provided by Renova AB and the owning municipalities. Finally, 
data came from two observations (Czarniawska, 2007) made by two of us: (1) a 
participative study-visit at the Renova incineration facility of Sävenäs and (2) a 
tour of the route of waste through the waste chain, from household to the end 
stations (landfill and incineration plant), on the side of Renova employees. Con-
versations held throughout the observations were recorded, and when recording 
was not possible, hand-written notes were taken. In addition to all of the above 
data collection processes, one of us has brought into this study comprehensive 
data about waste management in Sweden, in general, and municipally-owned 
waste companies, in particular, that was generated for other related studies.  
Data was coded and categorized using the qualitative data analysis software 
NVivo. Interview transcripts, official documents, minutes of meetings, observa-
tion recordings, and field-notes have been used in a complementary and non-
hierarchical manner.  
 
4. Waste governance in Göteborg 
The case of waste incineration in Göteborg serves as an illustration of how and 
why an infrastructure that provides services that have long been deemed as satis-
fying can inhibit the development of innovative, alternative infrastructural solu-
tions. To explain why, we first describe the key traits of Swedish waste govern-
ance. Then, we describe the organization of waste management in Göteborg.  
 
4.1 Swedish waste governance  
Formally, Swedish waste governance is organized as follows. A privately-owned 
system of extended producer responsibilities (EPR) answers for the collection 
and processing of specific waste streams such as packaging, end-of life vehicles, 
electrical and electronic equipment, or batteries. Municipalities have the respon-
sibility for the collection and processing of the household waste that is not en-
compassed by the EPR system. And the collection and processing of industrial 
and hazardous waste from industries are deregulated, market-based activities 
(Avfall Sverige, 2011).  
Municipalities can handle their responsibility for household waste in three 
different ways: through municipal departments, municipally-owned waste man-
agement companies, or public procurements. And municipalities tend to proceed 
in different ways for the different stages of waste management: first the collec-
tion and then the treatment of waste. Three out of four have chosen public pro-
curement to organize the collection of waste from households, inclusive of trans-
fer and transport. But nearly all municipalities have chosen to answer for the 
treatment of waste (e.g., storage, segregation, incineration, composting, produc-
tion of biogas, material recovery and recycling, disposal at landfills), primarily 
through municipally-owned waste management companies (Avfall Sverige, 
2011). 
Municipally-owned waste management companies thus play a pivotal role 
for Swedish waste governance: they enjoy a monopoly on household waste with-
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in the jurisdiction of their owner or owners, and can compete with privately-
owned companies or other municipally-owned waste management companies for 
all other waste. Municipal waste companies can even import waste. However, a 
series of judgments by the European Court of Justice, followed by a recent inter-
vention of the European Commission to the Swedish government have imposed 
limits on how much turnover municipally-owned waste companies can make 
with others than their owners (Corvellec, Bramryd, & Hultman, 2012). 
Some key figures will define the contour of Swedish waste management. In 
2010, inhabitants in Sweden produced an average of 463 kg of household waste 
per person, down from 513 kg in 2007. Incineration is the most common treat-
ment method (49%) for household waste, followed by material recycling (36%) 
and biological treatment (14%); landfills receive only 1% of household waste 
(Avfall Sverige, 2011)1.  
The predominance of incineration as a waste treatment technique is largely 
due to the historical fact that Swedish municipalities have long been answering 
for both waste management and district heating systems, and that they have 
developed these two infrastructure systems in parallel, in particular during the 
post WW2 urban development and after the 1973 and 1978 rises in oil prices. 
Interlocking waste management with district heating systems makes it possible 
to recover two to three times more energy from waste than if one only retrieves 
electricity from waste. District heating is today the most common source of 
energy used for heating and hot water in dwellings and non-residential premises 
in Sweden (Energimyndigheten, 2011), and waste accounts for 16% of the fuel 
used for district heating (Svensk Fjärvärme, 2012). Waste is a well-established 
alternative fuel in Swedish cities, and waste incinerators have become, accord-
ingly, stabilized infrastructures, interlinked and co-dependent with other critical 
urban infrastructures such as district heating or power production. 
 
4.2 Waste Management in Göteborg Metropolitan Area  
One of the 31 Swedish cities where energy is recovered from waste is the Met-
ropolitan Area of Göteborg with a total population of over 920,000 peoples. The 
management of solid household waste in the area is provided by the municipal 
company Renova AB, and it is co-owned by eleven municipalities in the Göte-
borg area. The rationale behind this co-ownership was a mutually felt need for 
cooperation to promote a sustainable management of waste, encourage growth, 
and join resources to finance a capital hungry infrastructure (interview). Reno-
va’s operations include collection services for housing companies, (collection is 
still the largest income for the company), waste incineration with energy recov-
ery (the second largest source of income), handling of hazardous waste, waste 
sorting, composting, soil decontamination, landfill deposition, and trans-
shipment centers for waste transportation. 
Incineration with energy recovery is the key waste handling process in Gö-
teborg and this is done in the Renova-owned Sävenäs combined heat and power 
(CHP) incineration plant. The plant has existed for more than 40 years and is 
licensed to receive 550,000 tons of waste per year from households and industry. 
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In 2010, its four boiler lines have extracted 220,927 MWh of electricity and 
1,440,620 MWh of district heating out of 539,118 tons of waste. This production 
corresponds to the annual electricity consumption of ca. 110,000 apartments, or 
ca. 5% of the electricity consumed in Göteborg, and as much as ca. 30% of Gö-
teborg’s needs in district heating (Renova, 2011a, b). Sävenäs is certainly a ma-
jor element of the Metropolitan Area’s energy production system. 
The history of the Sävenäs incineration plant is inseparable from the history 
of Göteborg Energi, the municipally-owned company that delivers district heat-
ing to the local community. Göteborg Energi’s district heating is 1,000 km long. 
It provides heating to more than 90% of all apartment blocks in Göteborg and 
approximately 9,000 single-family houses (Göteborg Energi AB, n.a.-a). Waste 
heat accounts for 86% of the fuel mix for district heat production (Göteborg 
Energi AB, n.a.-b). The Sävenäs plant is also pivotal to the policy of the Göte-
borg Metropolitan Area to reduce their CO2 emissions. Renova (Renova, 2011a, 
b) underscores that Sävenäs produces energy for an equivalent of 175,000 m3 of 
oil or 160 million m3 of natural gas. Sävenäs also plays a key role in Renova’s 
efforts at minimizing the amount of waste sent to landfill.  Such figures are piv-
otal to the image of incineration and Sävenäs as an environmentally friendly 
infrastructure. 
Our respondents depict the Sävenäs incineration plant as being at the fore-
front in processing waste into energy. They feature the plant as functioning in 
the most possibly effective and environmentally friendly way: recovering the 
highest rates of energy from each ton of waste with the least emissions to the 
environment. The fact is that Sävenäs has been singled out as a best practice case 
for the successful transformation of waste into clean energy (electricity and 
district heating) by the Cities for Climate Change of the Clinton Foundation 
(C40 Cities & Clinton Climate Initiative, 2010). The foundation underscores that 
“Gothenburg's system of incinerating waste to make electricity and heat is highly 
efficient,” and that “[b]enchmarked against other European countries, the system 
in Gothenburg compares very favourably – around 3.3 MWh per ton are generat-
ed for heating and electricity.”  
 
5. Rationales of lock-in 
Despite the fact that Göteborg’s incineration-based waste management system is 
celebrated internationally, its legitimacy may be at stake. Convergent calls for 
alternative waste management solutions put waste governance authorities in 
front of a concrete need to develop new waste management solutions. But the 
performance of the current system stands in the way of bringing forth innovative 
alternatives: the existing management system is locked-in to incineration. 
In the present section we describe the rationales of this lock-in. Four ration-
ales are presented: institutional, technical, cultural, and material. Together, these 
entwined rationales explain the difficulties that exist to challenge incineration in 
Göteborg. 
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5.1. Institutional rationale of lock-in  
This rationale has a legal and a political dimension. Following the EU directive 
on landfills (European Council, 1999/31/EC), the Swedish legislation introduced 
a ban on landfill of sorted burnable waste in 2002 and of organic waste in 2005 
(SFS, 2001:512). This legislation has clearly contributed to strengthen the strate-
gic role of the Sävenäs incineration plant and institutionalize waste incineration 
in Göteborg and its region.  
The reduced access to landfills created a need for alternative ways of pro-
cessing waste. Incineration was logically featured as the most sustainable solu-
tion to this need as the Sävenäs plant presented the double advantage of existing 
already and of being expandable. Indeed, when public officers working for 
Renova were asked about the impacts on their activities of the introduction in the 
2000s of the European Waste Hierarchy model (Hultman & Corvellec, Forth-
coming), they answered that Renova was already on the track since waste incin-
eration has been long established in the metropolitan area:  
We who work with waste, one could say we have been thinking in 
terms of the waste hierarchy since the early 90s … so for us, this 
waste directive was nothing new. We had long been thinking like 
that. (Interview Renova manager) 
However, a more recent EU directive (European Commission 2008/98/EC) 
questions the legitimacy of waste incineration infrastructures and practices. In-
cineration with energy recovery is still placed ahead of sending waste to land-
fills; but it is ranked behind reuse, recycling, and prevention. Accordingly, Swe-
den’s recently approved national waste plan (Naturvårdverket, 2012) asserts a 
need for initiatives that improve the resource efficiency of the current waste 
governance. The new national waste plan insists more than its predecessors on 
the need to reduce the quantity and dangerousness of waste by efforts directed at 
the prevention of waste. For example, concerning food waste, the Swedish gov-
ernment has set a new interim goal for food waste management in April 2012: by 
2018, food waste from households, institutional kitchens, shops and restaurants 
shall be separated and processed in such a way that at least 50 percent of nutri-
ents and 40 percent of energy shall be taken care of (Regeringskansliet, 2012). 
The Gothenburg Region Waste Plan (2012) echoes these targets and commits to 
reduce food waste up to 50% by 2020. Waste decision makers are pressured to 
give room to other waste handling methods than incineration, for example, waste 
prevention or the production of biogas. 
Listening to this pressure and the demand from local politicians, the man-
agement of Renova together with Göteborg Energi studied the possibility of 
transforming food waste into biogas as an alternative to composting or incinera-
tion. The construction of a waste to biogas plant was rejected in 2010, though. 
According to our interviewees, arguments were brought forward that one could 
not collect enough food waste, reach enough profitability, and be certain that 
municipalities would continue to enjoy a monopoly on household waste in the 
future. Instead, a decision was made to build a pre-treatment plant that would 
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open in 2012 to produce slurry that biogas-plants elsewhere would transform 
into biogas (Renova, n.a.). 
 This half step towards the production of biogas illustrates the reluctance 
there exists among the majority of decision makers in Göteborg to frontally 
challenge the political lock-in (Grabher, 1993) around the present incineration-
based waste management system and the Sävenäs plant. Despite a clear position-
ing of European and national authorities in favor of a long-term evolution of 
waste handling beyond incineration, local actors perceive this legal and political 
framework as unstable. In particular they wonder whether the municipal monop-
oly on household waste will continue or not. Consequently, they are disinclined 
to introduce radical changes. They fall back on wary choices (non-choices for 
some). And they make rather conservative decisions, well anchored in existing 
legislation, that lock-in waste to incineration infrastructures and practices.  
 
5.2. Technical rationale of lock-in 
From the point of view of economic technique, the construction of the Sävenäs 
plant in the 1970’s was made possible by the characteristic financial strength of 
Swedish municipalities, the historical Swedish tradition of municipal collabora-
tion (Larsson & Bäck, 2008), and post-war Sweden’s confidence in public wel-
fare policies. But an investment of this size also prompted a long-term demand 
for economic returns that locked-in the waste management system in Göteborg 
to high-volume delivery of energy. 
Our interviewees explain that the Sävenäs waste incineration plant stood for 
a reasonable way of drawing economic advantages from the metropolitan area’s 
regularly rising waste volumes. Waste handling evolved in the 1970s from a 
concern for securing public health and mitigating environmental risks to a con-
cern for producing energy and contributing to regional development. The munic-
ipal monopoly on waste (later reduced to household waste) secured the compa-
ny’s access to a steadily growing supply of waste, and the inter-locking of waste 
incineration to district heating created a stable outlet for Sävenäs’ energy pro-
duction:  
It’s misleading to talk about waste incineration without mentioning 
district heating … Waste incineration is cheap to run; however, the 
initial investment is enormous. It requires a stable company that in-
vests in it, how shall I put it, with a steady purpose over a long period 
of time … I used to say that the biggest investment in Göteborg we 
cannot see: it is under our feet. (Interview, Renova manager; “under 
our feet” refers to the network of district heating installations that are 
buried under the ground of the city) 
This view was supported by the good economic results of the Sävenäs plant. 
It was also supported by a systematic increase in waste incineration expertise 
that brought Sävenäs to the forefront of technological and environmental devel-
opments, keeping at bay eventual criticisms against incineration. Economic 
rationality concurred with technical prowess to make incineration essential to 
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waste management in Göteborg. And this essential character of incineration 
made alternative waste treatment methods, such as biogas extraction, less inter-
esting. Alternative treatment methods were simply not deemed to be an econom-
ically sound way to spend tax money – at least before one had recovered the 
massive investments made in Sävenäs. 
Efforts at challenging incineration and advocating alternative waste handling 
methods were met with difficulties. As an example, around 2005 and during the 
following years, an opportunity was turned down to unlock the local treatment of 
waste from incineration. After some years of preliminary skirmishing in the city 
council, a decision was made in the mid 2000s to add a fourth boiler line to the 
Sävenäs plant (Göteborg Stad Kommunfullmäktige, 2007). This further com-
mitment to incineration was controversial, though. The Green Party (Miljöpartiet 
de gröna) opposed it (Göteborg Stad Kommunfullmäktige, 2007), arguing that 
more innovative and sustainable alternatives such as biogas, recycling, or waste 
prevention should have been explored instead, but this opposition was to no 
avail. This fourth boiler was put into use in 2009. Eventually, a reduction of the 
amount of waste produced in 2008 showed that this fourth boiler had brought 
with it an overcapacity of incineration in the region. To compensate for this local 
shortage of waste, Renova has to take in waste from Norway and other Swedish 
municipalities, an illustration of the dependence of Renova on high volumes of 
waste, even on a growth of waste production 
As one of the politicians who sat on Renova’s board underscores, board 
members are highly dependent on the company’s managers to inform them, and 
they find it difficult to argue against the managers about technicalities: 
We [The Green Party] did not want the fourth boiler, and we told 
them [Renova]: no, do not build it. Let’s decrease the amount of 
waste produced instead, and [do] this with the biogas and everything. 
I thought they listened but it was like it was already decided. They re-
turned with figures and calculations and the politicians accepted their 
arguments. (Interview, politician) 
The technological component of incineration tends to keep non-experts, 
even the politicians who are formally in charge of governing the company, away 
from the decision-making processes that determine the development of the infra-
structure. Renova is a municipally owned company, but it is in practice difficult 
for the politicians in charge to govern such a large and complex technological 
infrastructure. Inversely, managers underscore that the board should come with 
coherent demands. They consider that if the board wants the company to invest 
in biogas, it should also acknowledge that developing the production of biogas 
might entail a decrease in profitability from the current levels and, therefore 
lower their demands for economic returns that it imposes on the company. In the 
managers’ view, instead of complaining that the company keeps subordinating 
the environment to profitability, the board should create economic conditions 
that make it possible for the company to engage in a biogas production strategy. 
Difficulties for board members and managers to come to a practical agreement 
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about how to articulate economy and ecology bring forth a stalemate that bene-
fits the solution in place more than alternative waste handling solutions. 
 
5.3 Cultural rationale of lock-in 
Renova’s accumulated expertise in incineration technology has participated 
decisively in establishing a culture-bound cognitive lock-in (Grabher, 1993) to a 
common understanding of the benefits of incineration for Göteborg. With its 
high-efficiency filters and significant production of energy, Sävenäs stands in the 
collective imagination within the Metropolitan Area as a success story of profit-
able and sustainable waste management. Through the years, the incineration 
technology and infrastructure has been developed and improved until the 
Sävenäs plant is considered one of the best in the world, and has also been 
acknowledged as such (C40 cities & Clinton Climate Initiative, 2010; see also 
section 4.2). 
That Denmark and Sweden are the best [at incineration] in Europe is 
simple.2 In Western Europe, they had gas deposits and have built up 
gas networks. In Denmark and Sweden we chose district heating ear-
ly. It means that … the one who produces hot water has good oppor-
tunities to find on outlet for heat energy. The one who has not invest-
ed in district heating does not have any use for a plant like [Sävenäs]. 
(Interview, Renova manager) 
The story of incineration as a successful way to treat waste has locked-in 
public support around the notion that incineration is the most efficient, profita-
ble, and environmentally sustainable way to process waste. The Sävenäs waste 
incineration plant champions the modern ideal of a city where economic growth 
is conciliated with a sustainable livelihood. Local media and our interviewees 
have a vivid memory of a past when waste management under-capacity created a 
chaotic waste crisis. In light of this past, waste incineration appears as a legiti-
mate way to treat waste since it has successfully accompanied the economic 
growth of the city. Incineration is held to be a pragmatic solution to the waste 
issue (i.e., Sommestad 2009). 
Waste incineration is a solution that internationally has given rise to criti-
cism but that is not meeting as many public objections in Sweden as it does in, 
for example, France (Rocher, 2008) or Ireland (Davies, 2006). Instead, because 
it reduces the volume of waste sent to landfills, incineration is held as a pivotal 
ingredient of the societal narrative that equals good waste management with less 
landfilling (Corvellec & Hultman, 2012). In addition to that, since Renova pro-
duces a consequential share of the energy that the Metropolitan Area needs, it is 
difficult for anyone to disrupt the time-honored narrative that waste-to-energy is 
best, and Renova does it best. Over the years, the successes of incineration have 
brought a cognitive and cultural reluctance to abandon a solution that has served 
the city well for decades.  
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5.4  Material rationale of lock-in 
Finally, the material dimension of the Sävenäs plant makes this, as other physi-
cal infrastructures, difficult to change. Sävenäs is where the routes of waste 
collection meet the pipes of the central heating system. Renova’s boilers are the 
hub of a fine grained socio-physical network that connects all kinds of garbage 
receptacles to a myriad of radiators and warm water cranes all over the Region, 
inclusive of the behaviors attached to these. Any major change brought to 
Sävenäs would require a radical re-design of this network.  
 
Picture 1: The Sävenäs combined heat and power incineration plant to the right. To the left, the high-
way leading into central Göteborg; note the sign (close to the truck) welcoming travellers to Göte-
borg. In the center of the picture, the railroad track approaching the Göteborg central station 
© Patrik Zapata  
 
An incineration plant is a large installation that takes up considerable space. 
Erected close to the city center, the Sävenäs plant is highly visible from trains to 
and from Göteborg’s main central station and from the highway that leads the 
traffic into the city. Its massive presence is a constant reminder that incineration 
is the main waste treatment solution that is used in Göteborg (see picture 1). Its 
physical presence stands for the trust that the city has put in incineration. The 
Sävenäs plant participates thereby in defining the place specificity of the Göte-
borgian urban space. It is among that which shapes the image of the city (Lynch, 
1960). And this role of urban landmark strengthens the position of incineration 
in the Metropolitan Area. In particular, it suggests that any technology that 
would replace incineration would not only have to handle waste with technical 
efficiency and environmental effectiveness; it would also have to compensate for 
the spatial void that decommissioning the Sävenäs plant would involve. The 
materiality of the plant inscribes Sävenäs in the physical and imaginary fabric of 
the City.  
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5.5. Locking-in waste incineration in Göteborg 
The case of waste incineration in Göteborg corroborates Unruh’s (2002, 2002) 
thesis that a convergence of forces, relabeled here rationales, can create a lock-in 
that prevents the diffusion of waste management practices that are considered to 
be more sustainable, for example waste-to-biogas production or waste preven-
tion measures (Naturvårdverket, 2012). 
Today’s waste management system in the city’s metropolitan area is an in-
heritance of political choices that originated in other contexts and for other pur-
poses, namely a waste disposal crisis leading to determined plans to reduce the 
amount of waste sent to landfills, and a series of unprecedented rises in oil prices 
in the 1970s that made it economically interesting to produce energy from waste 
for the newly developed district heating systems. These choices have been sup-
ported by a systematic development of technological competence and massive 
economic and symbolic investments in incineration. 
The reliance of Göteborg on incineration is embedded in a web that stabiliz-
es the existing techno-institutional order and hampers the development of an 
alternative waste policy. This web brings together disparate nods: legal texts 
such as the Environment Code (SFS, 1998:808) and the Waste ordinance (SFS, 
2001:1063); physical facilities such as the Sävenäs combined heat and power 
incineration plant that physically connects the waste handling and district heat-
ing systems; and institutional arrangements such as the long-term energy deliv-
ery contracts passed by Renova with Göteborg Energi.  
A majority of urban governance decision makers have deemed over the 
years that incineration provides returns that are satisfying, both in economic and 
environmental terms, and fit the idiosyncrasies of the metropolitan area. Doing 
something else is perceived as taking a risk, and, as a Renova representative 
stated, it takes some courage to take such a risk:  
When you are good at what you do, and famous for it [implicitly: as 
Göteborg is on incineration, our note], to start doing something else 
that you might not be so good at, or that will cost a lot of money – 
who will take that risk? It takes brave politicians that are prepared to 
take that risk. (Interview, Renova manager) 
And most importantly, the local population has not found any reason to chal-
lenge incineration as waste handling method. Things would be fine, except that 
the current waste handling system creates a lock-in to incineration that fixes 
Göteborg’s waste management at the next lowest step of the European Waste 
Hierarchy.  
 
6. Concluding discussion: Unlocking infrastructures 
The case of waste incineration in Göteborg shows how an infrastructural lock-in 
involves different but interrelated rationales that work independently, one from 
the other, but can at times reinforce or weaken one another: an institutional ra-
tionale that has legal and political dimensions; a technical rationale that has 
technological and economic dimensions; a cultural rationale that encompasses a 
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cognitive dimension; and a material rationale that pertains even to the spatial 
character of infrastructures. This could be considered as a specific result, espe-
cially in light of Hughes’s (1983) demonstration that technological systems fol-
low different development styles that fit the idiosyncrasies of the time and place 
of their development. But many similarities could be observed, not only with 
other cities that have interlocked waste incineration with district heating else-
where in Sweden, Denmark, and Finland, but also inversely in countries such as 
Ireland (Davies, 2006) or France (Rocher Laurence, 2008) where they have not 
systematically attached incineration to the production of heat and where the 
technique is also intensively questioned. The four rationales that are described 
above are generic enough to bear some relevance even in other contexts.  
In addition, these four rationales also provide some clues about how an in-
frastructure can be unlocked. An unlocking impetus can come from a change in 
legislation, such as when the EU and national legislation stress the importance of 
waste minimization and the superiority of biogas production over incineration 
(Hultman and Corvellec, forthcoming). It can come from changes in the political 
orientation of ruling parties or changes in the political majority that displace the 
order given to economic and ecologic preferences. It can come from economic 
changes (D’Costa, 2002) such as an increased demand for non-fossil fuels for 
vehicles. The unlocking impetus can also come from the need of maintenance, 
repair, and extension (Graham and Thrift, 2007) which creates moments of po-
tential rupture in infrastructure lock-in. Renewals and transformations make it 
possible to introduce new technologies (Foxon & Pearson, 2007). As Moss ob-
serves (2011), the obsolescence of urban infrastructures has an unlocking poten-
tial “for re-thinking radically how infrastructures are planned, and what services 
are required so as to take greater account of today’s policy objectives for envi-
ronmental and climate protection” (p.28). Future needs for renewals and trans-
formations at the Sävenäs plant will create more moments like the one when a 
decision had to be made whether or not to build a fourth boiler. 
What an un-locking process needs to commence is a sequence of events act-
ing as catalyst for concerns and initiatives (Cowan and Hultén, 1996; Unruh and 
Carrillo-Hermosilla, 2006). Such concerns and initiatives introduce new ideas, 
values and narratives that challenge the locked-in order. For example, the Green 
Party in Göteborg challenged the waste incineration coalition on several occa-
sions during the last decade by questioning the economic rationality of investing 
in expensive infrastructures. Such arguments are likely to surface in future de-
bates. And even if waste is today openly considered as a resource (Swedish En-
vironmental Protection Agency, 2005) and thus something that should be ex-
ploited as efficiently as possible, it may only be a question of time before alter-
native views reach the columns of the local newspaper or the debates in City 
Hall, for example: that urban sustainability requires waste policies that give a 
priority to reducing rather than exploiting waste; that considering waste as a 
product on a market is not likely to induce a diminution of waste volumes; and 
therefore that marketization of waste presents a long-term challenge to sustaina-
ble urban transformations (Zapata and Hall 2013). 
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Lock-ins are matters of co-evolutions (Geels, 2005a; Geels, 2005b), and to 
overcome a lock-in, policy makers and city managers have to re-orient an array 
of interrelated factors (Könnölä, Unruh & Carrillo-Hermosilla, 2008; del Río & 
Unruh, 2007; Unruh & Carrillo-Hermosilla, 2006). Understanding the rationales 
at work in a specific lock-in and how they co-evolve is pivotal to any relevant 
analysis of the lock-in and any effort aimed at unlocking the infrastructure. 
However, of even more general relevance than understanding that different ra-
tionales are at play is understanding that the notion of infrastructure lock-in 
offers an analytical and practical leverage to understand and orient urban policy 
towards sustainability. 
The policies, laws, plans, and programs that aim at unlocking infrastructure 
need to acknowledge the local practices and the local lock-ins that hamper sus-
tainability. Urban policy towards sustainability also has to acknowledge how to 
construct legitimacy around new emerging practices, laws, and physical infra-
structures. Decisions makers are invited to identify the potential that may exist in 
new legislation and imagine innovative ownership or collaboration patterns that 
create new institutional orders (March & Olsen, 1989). New economic condi-
tions and technological advances open new market possibilities for recycled 
materials and products. Likewise, new views on waste (e.g., industrial ecology 
(Chertow, 1998), cradle to cradle (McDonough & Braungart, 2009), or peak 
everything (Heinberg, 2007)) challenge the existing view that waste is a valuable 
resource to be exploited, and suggest instead that waste is something that should 
not be produced (Bulkeley & Gregson, 2009). Corporations and households are 
developing new ways to engage with waste, for example, sophisticated practices 
of source separation. And these new forms of engagement offer waste manage-
ment companies and public authorities opportunities for unlocking socio-
technical innovations (Bulkeley & Gregson, 2009).  
Path-dependence (e.g., Liebowitz & Margolis, 1995; Schreyögg & Sydow, 
2010) can be terminated and lock-ins can be unlocked (Cowan & Hultén, 1996; 
Witt, 1997). And this brings us to what might be the core innovative potential for 
the notion of lock-in. Coming to an understanding that a system is locked-in is a 
critical step towards ridding obstacles to innovation and opening up possibilities 
for alternative solutions. Going systematically through all of the legal and politi-
cal, technological and economic, cultural and cognitive, and spatial and material 
rationales described in this paper is a way to take this first step. In the end, the 
notion of lock-in is an invitation to critical reflection concerning the future eco-
nomic, social, and environmental performances of an infrastructure. Asking the 
question “Are we in a lock-in?” can serve as a practical starting point for sus-
tainable urban transformations. 
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Notes 
 
1 These figures are to be taken with some caution since they classify bottom and fly ashes as recycled 
products. Ashes stand for about 30% by weight of the waste that is incinerated, and not everybody 
would consider them as recycled products. 
2 Not every expert today would agree with this statement, though. 
